CPLR 1007: Indemnification Clause Interpreted To Cover Active Negligence by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 46 




CPLR 1007: Indemnification Clause Interpreted To Cover Active 
Negligence 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1971) "CPLR 1007: Indemnification Clause Interpreted To Cover Active 
Negligence," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 46 : No. 2 , Article 14. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol46/iss2/14 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
CPLR 1007: Indemnification clause interpreted to cover active negli-
gence.
In Levine v. Shell Co.,73 the Court of Appeals liberalized the inter-
pretation of indemnity clauses in order to allow third-party actions
pursuant to CPLR 1007. The defendant had been found guilty of
active negligence. It impleaded its tenant, on the theory that the lease
agreement between the defendant and the third-party tenant contained
an indemnity agreement which was broad enough to include even the
active negligence of the defendant. The pertinent contractual language
stated that
lessee shall indemnify Shell against any and all claims, suits, loss,
cost and liability on account of injury or death of persons or dam-
age to property, or for liens on the premises, caused by or happen-
ing in connection with the premises (including the adjacent side-
walks and driveways) or the condition maintenance, possession or
use thereof or the operations thereon.74
The Court held that this indemnification clause was broad enough
to include active negligence by Shell and therefore allowed the third-
party action. The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed, 5
under Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Co.,76 which held that
a contractual provision which purports to indemnify one against his
own negligence must be stated in "unequivocal terms." The Second
Department reasoned that since a person is under no duty to indemnify,
his contract must be strictly construed and there must appear an un-
mistakable intention to indemnify.77 The Court of Appeals reversed.
It held that the Thompson-Starrett doctrine had been vitiated by Kurek
v. Port Chester Housing Authority8 and Liff v. Consolidated Edison
Co.70 In Kurek, the Court had modified the doctrine by not requiring
that the indemnification clause be in "unequivocal terms" if there was
an intention to indemnify.8 0 In Liff, an indemnification clause which
simply stated that the party liable would indemnify "against any and
all liability" had been sustained.8'
Levine has extended the Kurek and Liff holdings. These cases
dealt with indemnification clauses which contained terms such as "of
73 28 N.Y.2d 205, 269 NXE.2d 799, 321 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1971).
74 Id. at 208, 269 N.E.2d at 801, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
75 35 App. Div. 2d 575, 313 N.YS.2d 581 (2d Dep't 1970).
76 271 N.Y. 36, 41, 2 N.E.2d 35, 37 (1936).
773 5 App. Div. 2d at 576, 313 N.YS.2d at 584.
78 18 N.Y.2d 450, 223 N.E2.d ., 276 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1966).
S9 23 N.Y.2d 854, 245 N.E.2d 800, 298 N.YS.2d 66 (1969).
so 18 N.Y.2d at 456, 223 N.E2d at 27, 276 N.YS.2d at 615.
8123 N.Y.2d at 855.
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whatsoever kind or nature" in reference to losses for which the in-
demnifying party would be liable. The indemnification clause in Levine
contained no such language. The Court held that the language in
Levine manifested a clear intent of indemnification for all claims,
including the active negligence of Shell. Now the test is whether the
plain meaning of the indemnity clause would fairly include the active
negligence of the indemnified party.82
ARTcILE 11-POOR PERSONS
CPLR 1102: Poor person held entitled to assignment of counsel in
action for nonpayment of rent.
Mindful that accessibility to the courts is often determined by
economic status, the legislature has extended to poor people certain
privileges under CPLR 1102.83 Free stenographic transcripts are made
available to an indigent,"4 and costs and fees are waived for him. 5 Addi-
tionally, the court "may assign an attorney.""" Prior to the CPLR, an
order which did not include assignment of an attorney was held defec-
tive.87 There is disagreement as to whether such assignment is discre-
tionary under the statute.88 Is this conflict rendered merely academic,
on the ground that a poor person's right to assignment of counsel is
implicit in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment?
In Hotel Martha Washington Management Co. v. Swinick, 9 the
Appellate Term, First Department, reversed the New York City Civil
Court, New York County, which had denied defendant tenant's mo-
tions to proceed as a poor person and for appointment of counsel. The
lower court had held that defendant failed to satisfy the requirements
of CPLR 1101, for she had neither stated her name nor provided a
list of her property and its value. The appellate court reversed on this
82 This test is the minority view regarding indemnification clauses. See Collins &
Dugan, Indemnification Contracts- Some Suggested Problems and Possible Solutions,
50 MARQ. L. REv. 77, 81, 82 (1966).
83 See 2 WK&M 1 1102.
84 CPLR 1102(b).
85 CPLR 1102(d). If the poor person receives a settlement or recovers a judgment, pub-
lic funds expended on his behalf in the course of the litigation may be recovered out of
that sum.
8O CPLR 1102(a).
87 Schechter v. Lichtenstein, 223 App. Div. 60, 61, 227 N.Y.S. 245, 246 (1st Dep't 1928);
Pankawicus v. Nichols Copper Co., 169 App. Div. 419, 420, 155 N.Y.S. 123, 124 (2d Dep't
1915). See SsxT REP. 172-73.
88 Compare 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 1102, commentary at 480 (1963) (no discretion) with
2 WK&M 11102.01 (discretion).
89 66 Misc. 2d 833, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1971).
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